Review of “Assessing Police Classifications of Sexual Assault
Reports: A Meta-Analysis of
False Reporting Rates” (Ferguson &
Malouff, 2016)
One of the problems in dealing with accusations of sexual assault
in the court of public
opinion, in the workplace, at schools,
and in the criminal courts, is that there is no consensus on
the
rate of true and false accusations. At one extreme are the few who
believe that most (i.e.
more than 50%) of reports of sexual
assault are false (Heenan & Murray, 2006 cited in Ferguson
&
Malouff, 2016, p. 1185) while at another extreme there are those who
claim that false reports of
sexual assault are virtually
non-existent (Theilade & Thomsen, 1986 cited in Ferguson
&
Malouff, 2016, p. 1185). The authors dismiss these extreme
positions by calling them
“misperceptions” that make dealing
with reports of sexual assault “much more difficult”
(Ferguson
& Malouff, 2016, p. 1185).
Then, there are also those who claim that false reports of sexual
assault are just as
infrequent as false reports of any other
crime: 2% (Russell & Bolen, 2000; Wells, 1985 cited in
Ferguson
& Malouff, 2016, p. 1186). Ferguson and Malouff find that this
position is also
incorrect. The authors find that the reason for
a lack of consensus in research findings is due to
the lack of a
consistent definition of ‘false reporting’ (Ferguson &
Malouff, 2016, p. 1186).
Thus, in agreement with the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP, 2005
cited
in Ferguson & Malouff, 2016, p. 1186-7), the authors recommend
that researchers define a
false allegation as “those reports
made which were untrue, which involved maliciousness
and
consciousness of the untruth on the part of the complainant,
and where evidence exists to prove
the crime… did not take
place” (Ferguson and Malouff, 2016, p. 1187). A
“thorough
investigation” (p. 1192) is required before a
report can be deemed false, according to this
definition. This
is a “conservative definition” by the authors’ own admission,
but they deem it
necessary so that “equivocal cases” (i.e.
cases that may be false or suspected of being false) are
not
included, because their inclusion would be too subjective and thus
lead to inconsistent
research findings due to biases among
researchers. However, the authors warn that “[u]se of such
a
conservative definition is not meant to imply that all other cases
are true reports…” (p. 1187).
Using this conservative
definition and an analysis of seven different studies, which used
the
same conservative definition, by various researchers who evaluated
reports made to police in
Canada, Australia, the UK, and the
USA, the authors find that false reports of sexual assault
occur
at a rate of more than 5% (p. 1185), which is higher than the rate of
false reports for other
crimes (2%). In order to avoid
“classification errors… by law enforcement
professionals”
researchers made independent evaluations rather
than rely on police classifications of whether
the report was
true, false, or equivocal (p. 1187).
The reasons the authors say that the “total false reporting
rate, including both confirmed
and equivocal cases, would be
greater than the 5% rate found here” are two-fold (p. 1185).
The
first reason is due to the conservative definition of what
makes a report ‘false.’ In all likelihood,
at least some of
the equivocal cases, ones where there is no evidence to show that the
report is
true or false, are in fact false. 1 The second reason
that the actual false reporting rate is higher than
5% is that
the reports analyzed by this study include only those made to police.
Thus, reports
1 The authors note that “[i]t is also possible that the
researchers categorized some true sexual
assault reports as
false” (1192), but this seems unlikely given the conservative
definition for
false reports.
made to “medical professionals, crisis centres, campus
counselors” are not included. Their
inclusion could increase
the rate of false reports because “[I]t is arguable that reports
made to
someone other than police… would involve a higher
false allegation rate, since they are easily
made, there are
fewer consequences, and sometimes greater benefits for the accuser”
(p. 1186).
The authors note that the studies they analyzed have
a number of shortcomings. For
instance, “[t]here of the seven
studies did not include information on how many cases were in
doubt
in addition to those confirmed to be false” (p. 1188). Moreover,
“another three studies did
not include allegations of sexual
assault or rapes made to police by males” (p. 1188).
As a
whole, however, the authors are able to show that it is important to
avoid extremist
positions in regard to reports of sexual
assault. Lately, governments and law enforcement
professionals
have adopted the position that complainants rarely, if ever lie,
about sexual assault.
This position has made pressing charges a
mere formality, because to investigate the claim is
equated with
calling the complainant a liar, and it has put pressure on judges and
juries to convict
defendants in trials despite reasonable doubt
of guilt. If the complainant is already framed as a
survivor of
sexual assault, then their testimony will of course carry more weight
than the
testimony of the accused.
The authors’ conclusions also support the dismissal of the
argument that false reports of
sexual assault are no more common
than false reports of other crimes. While >5% does not seem
like
a large percentage, it represents hundreds of falsely accused persons
and it is more than
double the 2% figure that is often cited by
many. Given the higher percentage of false reports,
these claims
should more thoroughly investigated rather than less.
The
conservative definition of ‘false reporting’ poses some problems.
One is that the
mere fact that a false report is not malicious
and conscious does not lessen the impact on the
person falsely
accused. So it may be useful to add the concept of ‘wrongful’ or
‘mistaken’ in
addition to ‘proven false’ reports. A
wrongful report would be one that is contradicted by
evidence,
but one that does not have apparent and conscious malice.
Ferguson, C. E., & Malouff, J. M. (2016). Assessing Police
Classifications of Sexual Assault Reports:
A Meta-Analysis of
False Reporting Rates. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(5),
1185–1193.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-015-0666-2